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The present paper aims to advance the understanding of the control of human behavior
by integrating two lines of literature that so far have led separate lives. First, one line
of literature is concerned with the ideomotor principle of human behavior, according to
which actions are represented in terms of their outcomes. The second line of literature
mainly considers the role of reward signals in adaptive control. Here, we offer a combined
perspective on how outcome representations and reward signals work together to
modulate adaptive control processes. We propose that reward signals signify the value of
outcome representations and facilitate the recruitment of control resources in situations
where behavior needs to be maintained or adapted to attain the represented outcome.
We discuss recent research demonstrating how adaptive control of goal-directed behavior
may emerge when outcome representations are co-activated with positive reward signals.
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INTRODUCTION
Human goal-directed behavior is supported by a set of men-
tal tools that tune action to dynamic environments. The ques-
tion how this adaptive control process works has received a lot
of attention in the literature (Morsella et al., 2009). Although
there exist different conceptualizations, such as executive pro-
cesses (Smith and Jonides, 1999), working memory operations
(Baddeley, 2007), and cognitive control (Miller and Cohen,
2001), they share three basic components of control: active main-
tenance of goal-relevant information; inhibition of irrelevant
information; and shifting of information (Miyake and Shah,
1999).
Most research on the control of human behavior considers
the person as the agent of control (Locke and Latham, 1990;
Bandura, 2001). People are assumed to control their behavior by
setting goals, keeping them active in mind, and adapting their
behavior when needed. More recent research adopts a mecha-
nistic account by suggesting that adaptive control processes are
self-emergent once a goal is activated (Braver and Cohen, 2000;
Postle, 2006; Hazy et al., 2007). In line with this mechanistic
account we take the activation of a goal as the starting point of our
analysis, and address the question of how the self-emergent pro-
cess may bemodeled to understand how goals instantiate adaptive
control.
Basically, two features are central to the control of goal-
directed behavior. The first feature pertains to the notion that
actions are represented in terms of outcomes. The second feature
comprises the rewarding property or value of these represented
outcomes. Research on ideomotor theory of action investigates
the first feature by examining and explaining how action-effect
knowledge is acquired and how outcome representations are
implemented in action selection (Hommel, 2013). Research on
the second feature investigates how rewarding or positive affective
signals, such as positive mood (Aspinwall, 1998; vanWouwe et al.,
2011), monetary gains (Muller et al., 2007; Heitz et al., 2008),
or positively valenced outcome information (Custers and Aarts,
2005; Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2008) influence perception and
cognition in action control.
In essence, both features work in tandem to control behavior
adaptively. Whereas outcome representations serve as reference
points for perception and action (Powers, 1973; Carver and
Scheier, 1982), accompanying positive reward signals assign value
or utility to outcomes (Shizgal, 1999) and facilitate the recruit-
ment of executive control processes (Locke and Braver, 2010).
However, a theoretical and empirical analysis of the combined
role of these features has largely been neglected in the literature.
Here, we aim to integrate research on the ideomotor principle and
research on the role of reward signals in action control.
THE ROLE OF OUTCOME REPRESENTATIONS IN THE
CONTROL OF BEHAVIOR
Human goal-directed behavior is thought to result from the
brain’s capacity to predict and represent actions in terms of
their outcomes (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007). Activating
an outcome representation prepares action in an offline fash-
ion (i.e., planned ahead). However, engaging in goal-directed
behavior requires knowledge about action-effect relationships.
Action-effect learning has been extensively studied and provides
an explanation for the emergence of outcome representations
(Shin et al., 2010). Basically, a link between action and effect is
formed when a consequence of a motor movement is observed
and further strengthened if this effect occurs consistently. Because
the link between action and effect is assumed to be bidirectional,
this strengthened link can be used to produce a specific out-
come. This is the ideomotor principle: activating an outcome
representation readily selects the action (Hommel et al., 2001).
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According to this principle, multiple outcome representa-
tions can be associated with multiple actions (Hommel, 1996;
Kunde et al., 2002). This way, goal-directed behavior is structured
around equifinality and multifinality sets. Multiple actions can
thus serve one outcome or a single action can produce multiple
outcomes, rendering goal-directed behavior adaptive (Kruglanski
et al., 2002).
Initially the ideomotor principle explains action selection on
a sensorimotor level. However, human behavior is more com-
plex and involves goals that are further removed from direct
motor activation. It can be suggested, though, that goal-directed
behavior emerges from simple movement goals to complex social
goals that are accessed in different contexts by the same mech-
anisms underlying action-effect learning (Maturana and Varela,
1987). We first learn to orchestrate our motor movements before
we can effectively hit a light switch and illuminate a dark
room. Eventually certain learned patterns of motor movements
become associated with new observable outcomes in terms of
sensory/perceptual and semantic/cognitive codes (Pulvermüller,
2005; Kray et al., 2006; Lindemann et al., 2006; Aarts and Veling,
2009). Indeed, it has been demonstrated that sensory-motor goal
representations (acquired in goal-directedmotor tasks) generalize
to abstract features of outcomes, such that outcome representa-
tions can become socially meaningful (Beckers et al., 2002).
People rely on these outcome representations during action
selection and execution. In cybernetic models of action control
outcome representations serve as reference points (Adams, 1971).
When an action produces an outcome not matching the pre-
activated outcome representation, an action-related error signal
is produced (Carter et al., 1998). Control is then necessary and
should subsequently result in switching to a new course of action
and inhibiting the old one. Active maintenance of the outcome
representation thus often operates in concert with other adaptive
control processes to attain the outcome.
THE ROLE OF REWARD SIGNALS IN CONTROL
Ideomotor theorizing provides a parsimonious framework to
understand how action-effect knowledge is acquired and how
outcome representations are involved in the selection of action.
However, it does not include specific predictions about when and
how outcome representations gain control over behavior. There
is a vast literature that does examine the emergence of adaptive
control from an affective-motivational perspective.
First of all, there is research on the role of positive mood or
emotion in cognitive control (Ashby et al., 1999; Fredrickson,
2004). This literature suggests that positive affect can broaden
cognition (e.g., making people more creative) or funnel cognition
(e.g., by focusing on local stimuli). Secondly, there is litera-
ture showing effects of prospective monetary gains on control
processing such that effortful behavior can be boosted or strate-
gically implemented (Bijleveld et al., 2012). Finally, the positive
valence of outcome representations (acquired through evaluative
conditioning procedures) can enhance effortful control in tasks
generating the outcome (Custers and Aarts, 2010). These different
lines of research suggest that positive affect, monetary gains and
positive outcome representations serve as a general reward signal
that acts as a common currency for modulating adaptive control
(Shizgal and Conover, 1996), which either results in increased
flexibility or more focused processing (Aston-Jones and Cohen,
2005). It remains unclear how the affective-motivational perspec-
tive deals with the question of when flexible or focused processing
dominates. However, it is assumed that adaptive control processes
originate from subcortical output releases of dopamine in the
PFC, which is associated with the processing of general reward
signals (Aarts et al., 2011; Chiew and Braver, 2011).
From this affective-motivational perspective, reward signals
have been found to play a crucial role in each of the three basic
components of adaptive control. Reward signals have been shown
to (1) cause active maintenance of task relevant information
and outcomes (Zedelius et al., 2011); (2) facilitate the inhibi-
tion of task-irrelevant information (Veling and Aarts, 2010); and
(3) reduce switch costs in task-switching paradigms (Dreisbach
and Goshke, 2004). These findings indicate the close relationship
between adaptive control of human action and the processing of
reward signals.
Reward-driven modulation of executive control is highly
adaptive, because it justifies the allocation of limited cognitive
resources (Pessoa, 2009). Resource allocation is guided by a prin-
ciple of conservation such that effort will be expended only if it
can be compensated by a significant benefit in the end (Brehm
and Self, 1989; Gendolla et al., 2011). Reward signals thus ensure
the recruitment of adaptive control processes when behavioral
demands are imposed by environmental changes. Indeed, there
are several studies that show how task demands and task incen-
tives interact in producing effort intensity (Bijleveld et al., 2009;
Silvestrini and Gendolla, 2013). In this research the conditions
of demand are often explicitly communicated and it is shown
that individuals invest effort only when the goal is attainable (i.e.,
moderately high demands) and valuable rewards are at stake.
Thus, people seem to make trade-offs by weighing explicit infor-
mation of reward value and demands. This raises the question of
whether demand information needs to be explicit or whether such
trade-offs also occur in contexts where differences in demands are
less clear.
In a recent line of research we addressed this question using
a modality shift paradigm (Marien et al., in preparation-a).
Participants were instructed to respond to visual or auditory tar-
gets as fast as possible. Immediately before presentation of these
targets we either presented a preparatory stimulus in the same
modality as the target (ipsimodal trials, e.g., visual-visual), or
a preparatory stimulus in a different modality (crossmodal tri-
als, e.g., visual-auditory). The latter type of trials requires more
resources (i.e., are more demanding) to respond to than the
former type, because participants have to switch their prepared
visual modality to the auditorymodality. This typically results in a
delayed response time caused by a modality switch cost, especially
when this switch cannot be anticipated (Turatto et al., 2002). On
half of the trials participants were presented with a 5 eurocents
coin which they could earn; on other trials this reward signal of
the coin was absent. Importantly, the preparatory stimuli were not
predictive of whether a switch would occur or not. As expected,
participants responded significantly faster when a reward was at
stake during crossmodal trials, but there was no speeded respond-
ing during rewarded ipsimodal trials. Furthermore, the absence of
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the latter effect could not be explained by physical limits of speed
of responding. Reward signals thus specifically reduce switch costs
in an instrumental way, even in contexts that are ambiguous
about task demands.
However, in most research on reward signals and cognitive
control participants are instructed to perform a given action to
obtain a specific outcome. Accordingly, research on the impact
of reward signals on adaptive control is thus mainly limited to
instructed task goals and does not consider how reward signals
interact with outcome representations in controlling behavior
(Dickinson and Balleine, 1994). We propose that analyzing the
interplay between outcome representations and positive reward
signals offers amore comprehensive examination of adaptive con-
trol of human action. In the next section, we discuss some recent
research that examines this interplay in more detail.
THE COMBINED ROLE OF OUTCOME REPRESENTATIONS
AND REWARD SIGNALS
The combined role of outcome representations and reward signals
has been examined to explore the building blocks of adaptive con-
trol in goal pursuit (Custers and Aarts, 2005, 2010). For instance,
the activation of the outcome representation of physical exer-
tion facilitated effortful control in action when this outcome
representation was immediately followed by reward signals (i.e.,
positive words) in an evaluative conditioning procedure (Aarts
et al., 2008). Participants resisted the pressure to release but per-
sisted in squeezing a handgrip. Furthermore, this study provided
evidence for the distinct roles of outcome representations and
reward signals. The mere activation of the outcome representa-
tion facilitates initiation of the action, but did not increase control
unless positive reward signals were attached to it. Several other
studies have also demonstrated the function of reward signals in
mobilizing action control (e.g., Capa et al., 2011; Köpetz et al.,
2011; Veltkamp et al., 2011).
Building on this line of research, we investigated whether the
pairing of positive reward signals with outcome representations
translates into adaptive control in terms of making people more
flexible in goal-directed behavior (Marien et al., 2012). In a modi-
fication of a set-switch paradigm (Dreisbach and Goschke, 2004),
participants had to turn on a light by pressing either a left or a
right key. On each trial, the correct response was indicated by
a dot of a particular color appearing either left or right. A dot
of a different color was presented in the opposite location, but
had to be ignored. Before each trial, a cue appeared consistently
reminding people of the outcome (turn on light). These cues were
immediately followed by positive or neutral stimuli. After some
trials, participants had to ignore the color they had to attend to
earlier and react to a new color. Participants in the positive reward
signal condition had significantly lower switch costs than those in
the neutral condition. These findings suggest that being able to
swiftly switch the course of action to obtain an outcome is depen-
dent on whether the outcome representation of the action was
co-activated with reward signals.
Whereas most studies on the combined role of outcome repre-
sentations and reward signals in facilitating control consider the
outcomes as given, from research on ideomotor theory one would
expect that these outcome representations are normally acquired
in daily life as a result of learning that the outcome follows
from an action (Elsner and Hommel, 2001). Thus, according to
our present analysis positive reward signals should only increase
control when an action is represented in terms of its outcome.
Specifically, only when the presentation of a specific stimulus
follows an action rather than preceding it, will an accompany-
ing positive reward signal cause people to engage in controlled
behavior to obtain the outcome.
In a recent test of this idea (Marien et al., in preparation-b),
participants had to execute an action (pressing a key) that was
either preceded or followed by a stimulus on the computer-screen
(e.g., the word “scissors”). The stimulus was accompanied by a
neutral or positive reward signal by presenting a spoken word
through headphones (e.g., the word “with” or “nice”). Thus, the
stimulus represented an outcome of an action or not, and this
outcome representation was co-activated with a reward signal or
not. After some pairings, participants were presented with the
stimulus on the screen and had to press another key repeatedly
to move the stimulus closer to themselves in an easy way (one
single key) or a more demanding way (multiple keys). Faster
repetitive action in this task implies more control. Results showed
that participants were faster in moving the stimulus to them-
selves only when it represented an outcome of their action and
was co-activated with a positive reward signal. This effect was
more pronounced when moving the stimulus to themselves was
demanding. These findings suggest that adaptive control of goal-
directed behavior is more likely to occur when positive reward
signals accompany the process of representing action in terms
of outcomes. Moreover, resources to control behavior seem to
be allocated to obtain the outcome according to a principle of
conservation (Silvestrini and Gendolla, 2013).
CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND PROSPECTS
We proposed that an integration of ideomotor accounts with
affective-motivational accounts of action can shed new light on
the control mechanisms underlying human goal-directed behav-
ior. Although ideomotor theorizing offers a framework to under-
stand how action-effect knowledge is acquired and how outcome
representations select action, it is less explicit in predicting when
and how control of behavior results from the activation of out-
come representations. To understand the emergence of adaptive
control reward signals should be taken into account. Although
there is some research investigating the impact of reward signals
on action-effect learning, the analysis is mainly focused on how
it affects the binding strength and performance of the associated
action (Muhle-Karbe and Krebs, 2012).
We also suggest that motivational accounts of adaptive control
should incorporate more insights of ideomotor theory. Adaptive
control processes are closely linked with reward processing, but
the role of outcome representations is under-investigated in this
literature. It is important for reward signals to connect with out-
come representations in order for them to have a profound effect
on adaptive control. The present analysis suggests that positive
signals of different sources denote the value of an outcome and
facilitate control of behavior. This implies that the influence of
reward signals on recruiting executive control resources might not
follow a direct path, but is mediated by the assigned value of the
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outcome representation. Future research could address (1) how
personal value of an outcome representation results from reward
signals, and (2) whether personal value mediates the instigation
of control.
One way to approach this matter is by analyzing the neurocir-
cuits prioritizing and controlling goals. Specifically, recent work
in cognitive neuroscience proposes the involvement of specific
neurotransmitter systems that cause people to exploit (being rigid
to reach a goal) or to explore (prioritizing other goals) their envi-
ronment (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005). Noradrenergic path-
ways in the brain are suggested to be associated with exploitation
while dopaminergic pathways are supposed to be engaged in
exploration.
This neurocircuit analysis of adaptive control can benefit from
the present analysis. Adaptive control in terms of flexible or
rigid/persistent processes may be dependent on the level of behav-
ioral representation to which reward signals are attached. Goal-
directed behavior is hierarchically structured (Botvinick, 2008),
and hence the control of behavior may be directed at the level
of action (means) representations or outcome (goal) representa-
tions depending on context and individual differences (Vallacher
andWegner, 1989). For example, goal-directed control of turning
on a light may be identified and guided by the representation of
“pressing the button” or “turning on the light.” So when represen-
tations of means are paired with reward signals action control is
more likely to occur on the means level. Paradoxically, this could
lead to more rigidity in control. We found that participants were
less prone to switch to another action when the representation
of the means was cued and paired with reward signals (Marien
et al., 2012). In other words, when an outcome representation
can be regarded as a subgoal of another outcome representation
higher in the hierarchy (i.e., “pressing the key” in order to “turn
on the light”), treating it with reward signals will increase local
exploitive focus instead of broad explorative processing (Gable
and Harmon-Jones, 2008). Taking the level of behavior represen-
tation into account may lead to specific predictions when reward
signals produce a flexible or rigid mode of control.
Research on adaptive control of human action can advance by
looking at outcome representations in combination with reward
signals. It can especially help us to understand how the human
mind functions optimally in the ever changing environment that
we inhabit.
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